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Values based practice and authoritarianism 
Abstract 
Values based practice (VBP) is a radical view of the place of values in medicine which 
develops from a philosophical analysis of values, illness and the role of ethical principles. It 
denies two attractive and traditional but misguided views of medicine: that diagnosis is a 
merely factual matter and that the values that should guide treatment and management can 
be codified in principles. But, in the work of KWM (Bill) Fulford, it goes further in the form of 
a radical liberal view: that the idea of an antecedently good outcome should be replaced by 
that of a right process. That however leads to a dilemma as to whether it can account for its 
own normative status. Given that difficulty, why might one adopt the radical version? I 
sketch a possible motive drawing on Rorty’s rejection of authoritarianism which replaces 
objectivity with solidarity as the aim of judgement. But I argue that, nevertheless, this does 
not justify the rejection of the more modest particularist version of VBP.1 
Introduction 
Values Based Practice (VBP) is a radical view of the place of values in medical practice. In this 
chapter I will first set out the steps one need to take to reach it and to highlight its radical 
liberal form in the work of KWM (Bill) Fulford. I will argue, however, that the radical version 
faces a dilemma when it comes to accounting for its own normative status. Given that 
difficulty, why might one adopt it? I sketch a possible motive drawing on Rorty’s rejection of 
authoritarianism which replaces objectivity with solidarity as the aim of judgement. But I 
argue that, nevertheless, this does not justify the rejection of the more modest particularist 
version of VBP. 
To begin with it will be helpful to have a contrasting view in mind whether or not it has ever 
been explicitly defended. (It is, in my experience, widespread among medical students at 
least.) On this traditional view, medical diagnosis is a matter of getting the facts right 
independent of any values. Values come into play in guiding – alongside good evidence 
based medicine – treatment and management. And when they do, they are codified in a set 
of principles, a proper understanding of which form a kind of moral calculus. The first two 
steps towards appreciating the radical status of VPB are recognising that it rejects both 
aspects of this traditional view. Values are implicated in diagnosis as well as treatment. And 
any moral principles to which we might appeal are insufficient. There is then a third step to 
which I will return shortly. 
The main principles of Fulford’s Values Based Practice are set out below [from Fulford 2004]. 
I will explicitly mention some of these – principles 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 – in what follows. 
Ten Principles of Values-Based Practice 
1: All decisions stand on two feet, on values as well as on facts, including decisions about 
diagnosis (the “two feet” principle) 
2: We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or conflicting and hence are likely to 
be problematic (the “squeaky wheel” principle) 
3: Scientific progress, in opening up choices, is increasingly bringing the full diversity of 
human values into play in all areas of healthcare (the “science driven” principle) 
4: VBP’s “first call” for information is the perspective of the patient or patient group 
concerned in a given decision (the “patient-perspective” principle) 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on my paper ‘Radical liberal values based practice’ Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 17: 988-91. I am grateful both to its publishers for permission to develop further the 
material published there and to KWM (Bill) Fulford for his comments on that paper. 
5: In VBP, conflicts of values are resolved primarily, not by reference to a rule prescribing a 
“right” outcome, but by processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different 
perspectives (the “multi-perspective” principle) 
6: Careful attention to language use in a given context is one of a range of powerful methods 
for raising awareness of values (the “values-blindness” principle) 
7: A rich resource of both empirical and philosophical methods is available for improving our 
knowledge of other people’s values (the “values-myopia” principle) 
8: Ethical Reasoning is employed in VBP primarily to explore differences of values, not, as in 
quasi-legal bioethics, to determine “what is right” (the “space of values” principle) 
9: In VBP, communication skills have a substantive rather than (as in quasi-legal ethics) a 
merely executive role in clinical decision-making (the “how it’s done” principle) 
10: VBP, although involving a partnership with ethicists and lawyers (equivalent to the 
partnership with scientists and statisticians in EBM), puts decision-making back where it 
belongs, with users and providers at the clinical coal-face (the “who decides” principle) 
Values are involved in diagnosis as well as treatment and management 
The first step to VBP is to recognise that values are involved in diagnosis as well as treatment 
and management. Three main arguments for this claim are available. First, it helps make 
sense of the recent history of debate about the status of mental illness in which mental 
illness is compared either favourably or unfavourably with physical illness. Second, to an 
unprejudiced eye, pathology – mental or physical – is an evaluative notion. Third, attempts 
to reduce the concept of illness or disease (or even disorder) to non-evaluative notions have 
failed for principled reasons. 
Fulford’s own influential argument for the first of these considerations runs a follows 
[Fulford 1989]. The key assumption that mistakenly drives both anti-psychiatry and 
biological defences of psychiatry is that physical illness is conceptually simple and value-free. 
This motivates anti-psychiatrists such as Thomas Szasz to compare mental illness 
unfavourably with physical illness [Szasz 1972]. But is also t motivates defenders of 
psychiatry such as Kendell and Boorse to attempt to argue that mental illness is, like physical 
illness, value-free [Kendell 1975, Boorse1975]. Without the first assumption, however, 
neither mistaken argumentative move is necessary nor justified. In setting out the 
consequences of this first claim – that physical illness is evaluative – Fulford draws 
particularly on Hare’s early work, especially his Language of Morals, on the logical properties 
of value terms [Hare 1952]. 
Hare pointed out that the value judgments expressed by (or implicit in) value terms are 
made on the basis of criteria that, in themselves, are descriptive (or factual) in nature. The 
value judgment expressed by ‘this is a good strawberry’, in one of Hare’s examples, is made 
on the basis that the strawberry in question is, as a matter of fact, ‘sweet, grub-free’. Hare 
then points out that where the descriptive criteria for a given value judgment are widely 
agreed or settled upon, it is these descriptive criteria that may come to dominate the use of 
the value term in question. This is a simple consequence of repeated association. In the case 
of strawberries, most people in most contexts value (prefer, like, enjoy) strawberries that 
are sweet and grub-free. Hence the use of ‘good strawberry’ comes to be associated with 
descriptions such as ‘sweet, grub-free, etc’ to the extent that it is this descriptive meaning 
that becomes dominant in the use of the term. This contrasts with, say, pictures where there 
are no settled descriptive criteria for a good picture because there is no general agreement 
about pictorial aesthetics. Hare’s general conclusion, therefore, is this: value terms by which 
shared values are expressed may come, by a process of simple association, to look like 
descriptive (or factual) terms, whereas value terms expressing values over which there is 
disagreement, remain overtly value-laden in use. 
This general claim applies equally to medical language. If illness (generically) is a value term, 
and if mental illness is more overtly value-laden than physical illness this is neither because 
(as Szasz argued) mental illness is a moral rather than a scientific concept, nor (as Kendell 
and Boorse argued) because psychiatric science is less advanced than the sciences in areas 
of physical medicine such as cardiology. Rather, Fulford argues, it is because psychiatry is 
concerned with areas of human experience and behaviour, such as emotion, desire, volition, 
and belief, where people’s values are particularly highly diverse. Following the Oxford 
philosopher JL Austin, Fulford distinguishes between problems of definition and problems of 
use to suggest that, whilst at heart mental and physical illness are both equally definitionally 
complex, mental illness is more problematic in use because it reflects more problematic 
areas of human experience and behaviour, namely areas such as emotion, desire, volition 
and belief, in which people’s values tend to be highly diverse. This line of thinking is 
reflected in VBP in the principle that: We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or 
conflicting and hence are likely to be problematic (the “squeaky wheel” principle). 
Fulford then goes on to conduct an exercise in what another Oxford philosopher, Gilbert 
Ryle, called the ‘logical geography’ of medicine, of the given features of the uses of the 
medical concepts to justify this values-laden view of the subject. If medical terms are value 
terms, in Hare’s sense, then many of the features of their use, including a detailed analysis 
of the many different kinds of disease concept, follow from the general logical properties 
they share with all value terms, combined, of course, with contingent features of human 
values (in particular the diversity of values in psychiatry). 
But there is a second consideration to support an evaluative view of diagnosis. To an 
unprejudiced if at least inquiring eye, both the general concept of illness and specific 
instances of illnesses at least simply look to be evaluative. On the second point, John Sadler 
has devoted considerable care to detailing and taxonomising the values involved in the DSM 
IV codification of mental illnesses. He claims that psychiatry is thoroughly charged with 
values but, at the same time, it disguises or denies the role that they play. Thus one key aim 
of his book is to explore the multiple roles of values in a variety of different areas. These 
include broad themes such as the patient and professional roles, technology, culture and 
politics. But it also concerns more specific areas of psychiatric interest such as sex and 
gender and genetics. So if Sadler’s piecemeal analysis is convincing then there is reason to 
believe that in mental illness, at least, values are widespread in diagnosis. 
But on the more general point, Fulford’s picture is sustained by the idea that there is more 
to pathology in general than what is unusual, for example. Illness is bad for us. So unless 
there is a way to explain away that apparently evaluative or normative aspect of illness, 
there is good reason to believe appearances. And, arguably at least, that is the case.  
Merely statistical analyses of what is usual and unusual do not seem to capture the fact that 
high intelligence is in itself a good thing and low intelligence is a bad thing. More 
sophisticated attempts to use the notion of biological function have had the more modest 
aim of explaining away evaluative or notions from the concept of disorder, rather than 
illness or disease, conceding that the latter notions also contain the ineliminable notion of 
harm [Wakefield 1999]. But even with regard to that modest aim, it is far from clear that the 
notion of failure of function presupposed explains rather than smuggling in normative 
notions [Thornton 2000]. 
If this is right, then even if it were the case that the set of illnesses, diseases or disorders 
could be captured using merely factual criteria, this would only be because, contingently, we 
agreed about the underlying medical values. (In much the same way if the criteria for apples 
which can be sold as fit for purpose are purely factual, this is because we happen to agree on 
which kinds of apples we like.) Such agreement may be merely culturally and temporally a 
local matter rather than answering to purely factual constraints about the nature of illness. 
To summarise this first point, VBP is radical because it contests the idea that medical care is 
based on a value free diagnosis. Values are in play in diagnosis as well as treatment or 
management. Hence:  
1: All decisions stand on two feet, on values as well as on facts, including decisions about 
diagnosis (the “two feet” principle). 
2: We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or conflicting and hence are likely to 
be problematic (the “squeaky wheel” principle). 
Principles are insufficient for value judgements 
The second step to articulate Values Based Practice is the rejection of both the sufficiency 
and the fundamental importance of moral principles in guiding medical practice. One reason 
for the first element of this is not as far from medical orthodoxy as it might appear but tends 
to remain hidden in medical ethical teaching [Thornton 2006]. It is implicit in the most 
influential recent approach to medical ethics: the Four Principles approach, a deontologcal 
or principles-based approach set out at length by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in 
their Principles of Biomedical Ethics [Beauchamp and Childress 2001]. In it, the authors set 
out four general principles to guide medical ethical reasoning: autonomy, beneficence, non 
maleficence and justice. 
These four, which do not derive from any single higher principle, are supposed to capture 
medical ethical reasoning. They can, however conflict. Standardly, for example, beneficence 
and non-maleficence are in tension in both surgery and drug treatment. In psychiatry, in 
particular, autonomy and beneficence are in tension in the case of involuntary treatment. 
And thus an implicit part of the Four Principles approach is to frame ethical judgements 
which go beyond the resources of the principles alone. 
Beauchamp and Childress describe two methods for dealing with such conflicts: specification 
and balancing. Specification is way of deriving more concrete guidance from the fairly 
abstract higher level principles. It is describe in outline thus: 
Specification is a process of reducing the indeterminateness of abstract norms and 
providing them with action guiding content. For example, without further 
specification, do no harm is an all-too-bare starting point for thinking through 
problems, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia. It will not adequately guide 
action when norms conflict. [Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 16]  
This looks at first to be a kind of deduction. Much as, once particular assumptions are made, 
Kepler’s Laws of planetary motion can be (more or less) derived from Newtonian Physics, so 
a specified rule can be derived from a higher level principle. And just as Kepler’s Laws are 
useful in the specific context of planetary systems so a specified principle – such as that 
doctors should put their patients’ interests first – can be tailored to give concrete guidance 
to cases of, for example, euthanasia. But although specification is some form of derivation, it 
cannot strictly be deduction because ‘specified’ lower level rules have more content, more 
information, than the principles from which they are drawn.  
The second tool for generating an actual duty from apparently conflicting principles is more 
obviously not a matter of simply unpacking the principles. It is called ‘balancing’ and 
complements specification thus: 
Principles, rules and rights require balancing no less than specification. We need 
both methods because each addresses a dimension of moral principles and rules: 
range and scope, in the case of specification, and weight or strength, in the case of 
balancing. Specification entails a substantive refinement of the range and scope of 
norms, whereas balancing consists of deliberation and judgement about the relative 
weights or strengths of norms. Balancing is especially important for reaching 
judgements in individual cases. [ibid: 18] 
Thus despite the emphasis on the importance of the four principles, Beauchamp and 
Childress do still suggest the need for a degree of non-principles-driven judgement explicitly 
in the case of ‘balancing’ and implicitly in the case of ‘specification’. And thus even on this 
influential approach to medical ethics, the principles themselves are insufficient to guide 
practice. (That is why I stressed that there is no higher order principle. The view of which 
principle should dominate is not determined by the principles themselves but, somehow, 
from outside them.) 
Values Based Practice goes further than this, however. Although it concedes that there can 
be sufficient agreement about some values that they can codified to provide the basis for 
ethical codes and guidelines, these remain just a small part of the values that have to be 
taken account of in guiding medical practice which include individual preferences, desires, 
wishes, firmly held faith and convictions and so forth. By stressing this multiplicity, it stresses 
the standing possibility of disagreements and clashes in thinking about particular 
circumstances.  
This contrasts with the way that even where there are well known clashes in the Four 
Principles approach, it is tempting to think that there are standard solutions. Thus, for 
example, the case of the Jehovah’s Witness who competently refuses life threatening 
treatment is taken to exemplify the conflict of beneficence and autonomy and on the 
standard solution, autonomy is taken rightly to dominate [cf. Beauchamp 2003, Macklin 
2003]]. (Things differ in the standard case of his or her young child.) The case is sketched in 
abstract and ideal terms and becomes, itself, a kind of rule to be applied to further actual 
cases. Competence in solving standard cases, in applying the principles and giving them 
standardly approved weight, becomes second nature to medical students keen to pass their 
ethics course and the element of individual judgement is downplayed. 
So VBP makes explicit an idea implicit and often downplayed in conventional thinking about 
medical ethical practice, that there are diverse values in play and that attempts to codify 
them in principles are just a small part of the picture. Local context and individual 
preferences are the norm for VBP. Hence, the downplaying of principles-driven reasoning in 
the VBP claim: 
8: Ethical reasoning is employed in VBP primarily to explore differences of values, not, as in 
quasi-legal bioethics, to determine ‘what is right’ (the ‘space of values’ principle). 
Taken together with the claim that such values are in play in diagnosis as well as treatment, 
this is already quite a radical view of the place of values in medical care. But there is a third, 
and yet more radical step, implicit in principle 8 in the rejection of ‘what is right’. 
Radical liberal VBP 
The yet more radical third step is what leads to principles 5 and 9: 
5: In VBP, conflicts of values are resolved primarily, not by reference to a rule prescribing a 
“right” outcome, but by processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different 
perspectives (the “multi-perspective” principle). 
9: In VBP, communication skills have a substantive rather than (as in quasi-legal ethics) a 
merely executive role in clinical decision-making (the “how it’s done” principle). 
It picks up something that ought to have been a worry about the comments above about the 
Four Principles approach to ethical judgement. I described it as a deontological or principles-
based approach. But I then went on to suggest that, according to its own methods, the 
principles themselves are often insufficient for ethical judgement. Both specification and 
balancing require elements of judgement uncodified by the principles. Values Based Practice 
embraces this feature and suggests that principles only have a limited role, in cases where 
there is agreement in values. But this should prompt two questions: what governs ethical 
judgements when they are not constrained by principles? And, why is there ever agreement 
in values? 
Before I address these questions on behalf of radical Values Based Practice, I will first outline 
a more modest answer. The more modest approach takes ethical judgements to be more 
like judgements of facts than they are like arithmetic judgements. Arithmetic can, at least 
arguably, be formalised in accordance with axioms and thus the correct answer to an 
arithmetic question can be determined or derived algorithmically from those first principles. 
This is the picture of moral judgement to which a full blooded principlist account subscribes. 
Moral judgements are determined by accord with principles. Those are what make such 
judgements true or false. But the Four Principles account does not seem able to live up to 
that because extra-principled forms of judgement enter through specification and balancing. 
An alternative to principlism is particularism. Moral judgements answer to real moral 
features of the world: the moral particulars realised in specific cases. And thus one way to 
interpret the Four Principles approach is on these lines. The principles do not determine the 
correctness or otherwise of judgements, despite first appearances. Rather, they serve as 
useful reminders of the sort of things to take into account when thinking through particular 
cases. Further, when we agree about moral values, this can be because we are correctly 
responding to real features of the world in the way that agreement about factual matters 
can be partially explained by those facts themselves impacting upon us. 
One might take this to be the way to think about Values Based Practice: modest particularist 
VBP [cf Thornton 2007: 49-88]. If so, it can accommodate Fulford’s emphasis on the 
complexity of particular cases and the necessity to develop skills in responding to conflicting 
values. But this does not seem, at least to be Fulford’s own view which appears to be rather 
more radical. 
The clue to this is the claim that ‘conflicts of values are resolved primarily, not by reference 
to a rule prescribing a “right” outcome, but by processes designed to support a balance of 
legitimately different perspectives’. Now particularism would also reject the idea of a rule 
prescribing a right outcome (because it stands opposed to principlism). But this VBP claim 
seems to go further and to replace the idea of there being a correct outcome, something 
antecedently good, with a right process [cf Rubin 2008]. This thought is further reinforced by 
the claim that ‘communication skills have a substantive rather than (as in quasi-legal ethics) 
a merely executive role in clinical decision-making’. Their role is substantive because the 
most there is of a good outcome is the use of a right process. It is not that the process is a 
reliable way to determine the antecedently real moral particulars. Rather, the process is the 
end itself. So in response to the question: ‘what makes a value judgement true or false?’, the 
answer seems to be neither accord with a principle or principles; nor accord with the real 
moral particulars; but rather, nothing further than competing views having been heard. So 
construed Values Based Practice is a radical liberal position.  
In a previous paper, I put this point baldly thus: ‘Fundamentally, all and any values deserve a 
hearing. All and any can be valued if they survive the right process’ [Thornton 2011: 991]. 
That is to overstate the position. As Fulford pointed out in reply: 
[T]he premise of values-based practice in and of itself sets limits to the values that 
are ‘values-based practice-able’. Thus, racism, and any other form of discrimination, 
as the NIMHE Values Framework makes clear, is incompatible in principle with 
‘mutual respect’ and hence is by definition beyond the pale of values-based practice. 
Racism that is to say, is a value that, in Thornton’s terms, doesn’t even get as far as a 
hearing within values based practice; it never gets into the process at all. [Fulford 
forthcoming] 
This picks up a claim that was already explicit in the 2004 paper ‘Ten Principles of Values-
Based Medicine’. 
The shared values which, in VBM, are the proper remit of the rules and regulation of 
quasi-legal ethics, provide, for a given group, a framework for decision-making; 
Where values are not shared, VBM starts not from the post modern ‘anything goes’, 
but from a principle of mutual respect with a range of clear and definite implications 
for policy and practice (mutual respect, for example, precludes racism because 
racism is incompatible with respect for differences...) [Fulford 2004: 230] 
In other words, Fulford has never claimed that VBP is purely procedural. It has always 
presupposed a framework of transcendental values, the values without which it would be 
impossible. But even this framework is deeply contingent. Fulford comments: 
while people’s values are highly diverse they are not chaotic. Values-based practice 
makes use of the (contingent) coherence of people’s values to work within 
frameworks of values shared by the relevant stakeholder group [Fulford 
forthcoming] 
If there is sufficient agreement in value judgements then codifications – whether ethical or 
legal or other – of them can be formulated. But such agreement is not explained as a 
response to real values ‘out there’ that command the agreement of right thinking people. 
The contingency is not merely that such value judgements are true (as empirical judgements 
can be contingently true) but rather, and more deeply, that there can be such agreement 
without the judgements answering to an antecedent notion of a good outcome. 
This in turn suggests that there two kinds of value judgements in play: those that are 
presupposed by the process of VBP and those that are the outcome of it. But neither sort, 
even including the transcendental values, are objective or independent. Both gain the 
degree of validity they possess either directly or indirectly from the VBP process. But the fact 
that without the framework of transcendental values VBP would be impossible is not yet to 
say that those values are right. To make that claim would require independent purchase on 
the judgement that VBP is itself good. (Consider an anthropological inquiry of the values that 
underpin the Beltane fire festival, for example. It is possible that there are some 
transcendental values for such a practice, without holding which no agent would enact the 
practice. But identifying them need not commit the anthropologist to endorsing either the 
festival or the necessary underpinning values.) 
This suggests a difficulty with the radical view, however. What is the status of the claim that: 
in VBP conflicts of values are resolved primarily, not by reference to a rule prescribing a 
‘right’ outcome, but by processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different 
perspectives? Note first that although it says that conflicts of values are resolved… this is in 
the context of Values Based Practice. So it should be read as saying: conflicts of values 
should be resolved … by processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different 
perspectives. But now we can ask, why should they? (It may be an analytic truth that they 
are within Values Based Practice, but we are invited to adopt this approach.)  
The worry, now, is that this seems to be a value of a different order from the values that 
should be put through the right process of balancing views. It seems to be a higher order 
value, inconsistent with Values Based Practice’s own approach. This then suggests a 
dilemma for radical VBP. It can either address the question of why we should value values in 
the way it suggests, but at the cost of violating its own principles, or it can attempt no such 
question, in which case it lacks the prescriptive force that gives it teeth. 
Authoritarianism 
Given this objection to the radical liberal version of VBP, why not adopt the more modest 
position outlined before which accepts the first two features of VBP but rejects the third in 
favour of moral particularism? In my earlier paper, I commented of an explanation of 
agreement in value judgements as answering to independent value judgements that: ‘That 
approach – particularism – perhaps smacks of authoritarianism and, in the context of 
medicine, recalls the dangers of totalitarian psychiatry’ [Thornton 2011: 991]. 
Fulford agrees that this worry was indeed part of the motivation for rejecting the objectivist 
leanings of all of his commentators in the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice: 
Worse still, there are clear hints of totalitarian leanings (understood as commitment 
to pre-set ‘good outcomes’) in all three commentators’ positions: Brecher’s 
apparent endorsement of ‘moral objectivism (p. 996) and later denial of patient 
choice (as ‘saddling’ the patient with responsibility, p. 997, see above), Hutchinson’s 
advocacy of Eudemonia as ‘the Good Life’ (p. 1001, emphasis added but 
Hutchinson’s capitalization), and Thornton’s moral particularism [2, p. 991], all 
suggest, as Thornton alone acknowledges, authoritarianism. That may or may not be 
a ‘good thing’ in theory. But as Thornton reminds us, when it comes to practice, 
authoritarianism in the guise of totalitarian psychiatry (involving as it did the 
imposition of a pre-set view of ‘good outcomes’) was the basis of some of the worst 
abuses of medical practice in the twentieth century [Fulford draft reply] 
The phrase ‘imposition of a pre-set view of “good outcomes”’ might carry either of two 
meanings, however. It might mean the imposition of a prejudiced view by powerful people. 
That would fit the label ‘authoritarianism’. But it would not justify the rejection of the 
particularist in favour of the liberal view since the rejection of such a form of 
authoritarianism is consistent with a particularist picture of values. 
Or it might mean that the process of deliberation of VBP answers to, is disciplined by, a, or 
the, good outcome, antecedent to and independent of the process. But if so, why think that 
responding to independently existing good outcomes is authoritarian? And can we 
understand VBP without ‘authoritarianism’? 
One motivation for that might be drawn from Rorty’s assimilation of a rejection of a religious 
view of sin and a rejection of the view of empirical judgements or beliefs as picturing or 
representing the world. Rorty rejects both views as forms of authoritarianism in favour of 
pragmatism.  
The pragmatists’ anti-representationalist account of belief is, among other things, a 
protest against the idea that human beings must humble themselves before 
something non-human, whether the Will of God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality. 
Seeing anti-representationalism as a version of anti-authoritarianism permits one to 
appreciate an analogy which was central to John Dewey’s thought: the analogy 
between ceasing to believe in Sin and ceasing to accept the distinction between 
Reality and Appearance... To have a sense of Sin, it is not enough to feel guilty. It is 
not enough to be appalled by the way human beings treat each other, and by your 
own capacity for vicious actions. You have to believe that there is a Being before 
whom we should humble ourselves. [Rorty 2007: 257] 
On this view, just as it is a sign of human maturity to reject religious authority in favour, 
instead, of human agreement so it is also a sign of maturity a picture of judgements as 
answering to a non-human standard. John McDowell summarises the connection thus: 
What Rorty takes to parallel authoritarian religion is the very idea that in everyday 
and scientific investigation we submit to standards constituted by the things 
themselves, the reality that is supposed to be the topic of the investigation. 
Accepting that idea, Rorty suggests, is casting the world in the role of the non-
human Other before which we are to humble ourselves. Full human maturity would 
require us to acknowledge authority only if the acknowledgement does not involve 
abasing ourselves before something non-human. The only authority that meets this 
requirement is that of human consensus. If we conceive inquiry and judgment in 
terms of making ourselves answerable to the world, as opposed to being answerable 
to our fellows, we are merely postponing the completion of the humanism whose 
achievement begins with discarding authoritarian religion. [McDowell 2000: 109-10] 
Rorty’s view is motivated in part by a general criticism of the idea that empirical judgements 
and beliefs can represent the world, a criticism which dates back to his attack on the 
metaphor of the mind as a mirror of nature [Rorty 1979]. In more recent work this has led 
instead to the emphasis on ‘solidarity’ rather objectivity [Rorty 1991]. But even if one did not 
share his more general anti-representationalism, one might still think that value judgements, 
in particular, cannot represent a realm of independent values. One reason for that – with 
echoes of Rorty’s work – might be the view that value judgements depend on contingent 
features of human subjectivity. It is only because of contingent features of our natures and 
cultures that we are in any position to make the judgements we do. Further, value 
judgements can be ‘hard’ in this sense: even having deployed very thorough argument and 
debate, there seems to be no guarantee of agreement. There are echoes of both of these 
two views in Fulford’s radical version of VBP. 
Thus, one way to motivate a rejection of authoritarianism in VBP, construed merely as the 
idea of being disciplined by some sort of right or good outcome, is to take note of the 
underlying contingency of value judgements and to conclude from this that the idea of 
objectivity in this area makes no sense. Such a view would have a precedent in Rorty’s more 
general account of the metaphysics of human thought. 
If so, however, there is an alternative to be found in what McDowell goes on to outline. The 
key idea is that neither the underlying contingency nor the idea that value judgements are 
hard rules out objectivity. 
One aspect of the immaturity that Rorty finds in putting objectivity rather than 
solidarity at the focus of philosophical discourse is a wishful denial of a certain sort 
of argumentative or deliberative predicament. On the face of it, certain substantive 
questions are such that we can be confident of answers to them, on the basis of 
thinking the matter through with whatever resources we have for dealing with 
questions of the relevant kind (for instance, ethical questions)... But even after we 
have done our best at marshalling considerations in favor of an answer to such a 
question, we have no guarantee that just anyone with whom we can communicate 
will find our answer compelling. That fact - perhaps brought forcibly home by our 
failing to persuade someone - can then induce the sideways glance, and undermine 
the initial confidence. Rorty’s suggestion is that the language of objectivity reflects a 
philosophical attempt to shore up the confidence so threatened, by wishfully 
denying the predicament. The wishful idea is that in principle reality itself fills in this 
gap in our persuasive resources. Any rational subject who does not see things aright 
must be failing to make proper use of humanly universal capacities to be in tune 
with the world.  If we fall into this way of thinking, we are trying to exploit the image 
of an ideal position in which we are in touch with something greater than ourselves 
– a secular counterpart to the idea of being at one with the divine – in order to avoid 
acknowledging the ineliminable hardness of hard questions, or in order to avoid 
facing up to the sheer contingency that attaches to our being in a historically 
evolved cultural position that enables us to find compelling just the considerations 
we do find compelling. 
Here too we can make a separation. This wishful conception of attunement with 
how things really are, as a means of avoiding an uncomfortable acknowledgement of 
the limitations of reason and the contingency of our capacities to think as we believe 
we should, can be detached from the very idea of making ourselves answerable to 
how things are. We can join Rorty in deploring the former without needing to join 
him in abandoning the very idea of aspiring to get things right... [McDowell 2000: 
112] 
This suggests two ways of thinking about VBP and authoritarianism. One can reject 
authoritarianism, construed as a commitment to good outcomes independent of any 
particular instance of the process of deliberation, and put the emphasis on process or 
solidarity and motivate it by invoking something like Rorty’s rejection of abasement to the 
‘Other’. One can appeal to this in the case of value judgements in particular because of their 
connection to the contingencies of human subjectivity and the omnipresence of hard 
judgements. 
But, if so, one will need to shore up that picture against the objection that it does not follow 
from those motivations alone. That is, one can combine the first two elements of VBP, which 
I outlined at the start, with a denial of a constitutive role of process and maintain that even 
in VBP value judgements are disciplined by evaluative particulars. One way to fill this out is 
to borrow McDowell’s own account in which the realm of values is in a transcendental 
harmony with our subjectivity [McDowell 1998]. That is, only those subjects with a particular 
kind of mind and life can have their eyes open(ed) to this tract of reality. (Thus the 
independence of the process or procedure of making value judgements and the values to 
which it answers is at the level of instances. In each individual case, the process may deliver 
the wrong judgement though as a whole, the process cannot in general deliver the wrong 
result.) Such an alternative is at least available to VBP at the cost of adopting, and defending, 
a particularist metaphysics of values.  
Conclusions 
I have set out two approaches to Values Based Practice and authoritarianism with their 
distinct philosophical costs. But there are reasons to favour the latter.  
First, as I argued earlier, proposing or supporting VBP itself presupposes a value which does 
not seem simply to await the VBP process. (Nor would granting it a transcendental status 
help, a precondition if one wants to practice VBP, since that would still be contingent on that 
conditional.) Thus the value of VBP itself cannot be accounted for within VBP’s resources if 
they are taken to exclude the idea of a good outcome, independent of a process of 
deliberation.  
Second, as Fulford’s fifth principle of Values Based Practice states: ‘In VBP, conflicts of values 
are resolved primarily, not by reference to a rule prescribing a “right” outcome, but by 
processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different perspectives (the “multi-
perspective” principle)’. But surely not just any balance would do? For example, a ‘balance’ 
imposed through undue force or influence by powerful parties to a clinical decision would 
not be a good outcome. So ‘balance’ is to be understood as something like the right or a 
good balance, which again seems to presuppose the kind of innocent authoritarianism in 
question.  
Third, as Fulford often stresses, VBP involves the exercise of skill. But the clearest way to 
understand the development of such a skill involves learning how to achieve a good 
outcome in complex circumstances. This may well resist codification into an algorithm. It 
may involve sensitivity to context. But that is just to repeat a particularist rejection of 
principlism about value judgement.  
Even if it is possible to position a radical, liberal version of VBP in the broader recent history 
of western thought, there remain reasons to prefer modest particularist Values Based 
Practice. 
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